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1. The two cultures 
 A military lawyer once joked that at professional meetings you can always tell 
which are the military lawyers and which the civilians. Military lawyers refer to the 
laws of war as ‘LOAC’—law of armed conflict—while civilians from the world of 
non-governmental organizations call the laws ‘IHL’—international humanitarian law. 
‘They’re in the business of saving lives’, he cheerfully explained. ‘We’re in the 
business of killing’.
1
  
The idioms are revealing. They dramatize what Eyal Benvenisti has rightly 
labeled a ‘cleavage between two visions of the law’, one that of armies aiming to 
‘conciliate the necessities of war with the laws of humanity’, the other ‘a manifest of 
humanitarian fraternity’.
2
 The LOAC vision of the law begins with armed conflict. It 
assigns military necessity and the imperatives of warmaking primary, axiomatic 
status.
3
 In this vision, the legal regulation of warfare consists of adjustments around 
the margins of war to mitigate its horrors. Those adjustments occupy a noble and 
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1
 Eyal Benvenisti comments on the same labeling phenomenon in E. Benvenisti, ‘Human Dignity in 
Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians’, (2006) 39 Isr. L. Rev. 81, at 83. 
2
 Ibid., at 82. The first quote, about conciliating military necessity and the laws of humanity, come 
from the preamble of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. The cleavage between military and 
humanitarian lawyers is an important theme in D. Kennedy, Of Law and War (2006); see, e.g., ibid., at 
28, 37-39, 85-88, 129-30.  
3
 See, e.g., M. A. Newton, ‘Modern Military Necessity: The Role and Relevance of Military Lawyers’, 
(2007) 12 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 877, at 885 (noting that the ideals of humanitarian law ‘are all 
achieved in the context of facilitating the accomplishment of military missions’). 
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important role that must be honored and that militaries in fact want to honor. But it is 
logically secondary, and it yields to the force majeure of military necessity. The law 
of war dwells in the interstices of warfare. 
The IHL vision begins with humanitarianism, and assigns human dignity and 
human rights primary status. It measures the progress of civilization in the enhanced 
protection of human dignity, views law as an indispensable instrument for advancing 
human dignity, and regards peace as the normal condition for human life. This vision 
regards war as a human failure—no doubt inevitable, in the way that poverty and 
injustice are inevitable, but, like poverty and injustice, not something that deserves 
legal priority over the protection of rights and dignity. This might sound like pacifism, 
but the IHL vision is not pacifist. It recognizes that human dignity and human rights 
need muscle to secure them—they are worth fighting for, and it is noteworthy that 
legal doctrines favoring humanitarian military intervention (doctrines like the 
responsibility to protect and the obligation to prevent genocide) grew out of IHL 
culture, not LOAC culture.  
I will have much more to say about these two visions, but this is enough for 
now. The important point is that the difference in visions largely corresponds with a 
cultural divide among lawyers concerned with the laws of war—a divide between 
what I shall call ‘humanitarian lawyers’ and ‘military lawyers’. The terminology is 
stereotyped. I don’t mean to imply that every lawyer in the military accepts the 
military version of the law of war (which I will call the LOAC version or LOAC 
vision) on all issues, nor that every lawyer working for an organization like the ICRC 
accepts the humanitarian version (the IHL version, for short) down the line. Some 
renowned experts have at different times in their careers worked for both military and 
 3 
humanitarian organizations, and some renowned scholars whose views represent the 
LOAC version of the laws of war are civilians.  
Nor, for that matter, do military lawyers always say ‘LOAC’ rather than 
‘IHL’—but the military lawyer I quoted was not being wholly facetious. The two 
visions of the law of war closely track organizational cultures. That, at any rate, is my 
conjecture as well as my concern. The concern, which I raise in the shadow of the 
‘lawfare’ debate, is that in the last decade military and humanitarian lawyers 
increasingly see themselves as competing teams whose goal is to ensure that their 
vision of law prevails. It may not always have been so. David Kennedy rightly notes 
that the ICRC ‘has prided itself on its pragmatic relationship with military 
professionals’, and ‘military lawyers and lawyers from the Red Cross are often able to 
find common ground with surprising ease’.
4
 At the same time, Kennedy warns, both 
military and humanitarian professionals often suspect the other of advancing legal 
positions for tactical reasons, and ‘the vernacular that promised a common 
conversation has produced a dialogue of the deaf’.
5
  
A recent address by the eminent scholar Yoram Dinstein illustrates the two 
cultures problem in action. Professor Dinstein delivered the closing remarks at a 
conference on ‘International Law and the Changing Character of War’ at the U.S. 
Naval War College. After congratulating the participants on an excellent conference, 
he warned of the ‘menace’ posed by ‘human rights zealots and do-goodniks, whom I 
shall call “human rights-niks” for short’.
6
 Professor Dinstein explains: 
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 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 85. 
5
 Ibid., at 135. Kennedy describes the ICRC’s restatement of customary international humanitarian law 
as ‘advocacy’ rather than legal analysis—a debatable assertion. Ibid., at 88, 97. 
6
 Y. Dinstein, ‘Concluding Remarks: LOAC and the Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It’, (2011) 87 Int’l 
L. Studies, 483, 488 (R. A. Pedrozo & D. P. Wollschlaeger eds.), www.usnwc.edu/Research---
Gaming/International-Law/Studies-Series/documents/NavalWarCollegeVol-87.aspx (accessed Dec. 20, 
2011). 
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Far be it from me to suggest that every human rights scholar or activist falls 
under this rubric…. But all too often today we encounter the unpleasant 
phenomenon of human rights-niks who, hoisting the banner of human rights 
law, are attempting to bring about a hostile takeover of LOAC. This is an 
encroachment that we must stoutly resist. 
 The human rights-niks in back are by no means to be confused with the 
barbarians in front: far from endorsing the methods of barbarism, the human 
rights-niks would prefer a non-violent solution to every conflict. Nevertheless, 
the danger that the human rights-niks pose is equally acute, since they threaten 
to pull the legal rug from under our feet.
7
 
The ‘barbarians’ are terrorists and militants who willfully violate the rules of warfare, 
and it is startling that Professor Dinstein regards the danger ‘human rights-niks’ pose 
as ‘equally acute’. Concluding his speech, Professor Dinstein offers advice: 
(a) Keep up the good work on the application and interpretation of LOAC. 
(b) Keep poachers off the grass.
8
 
 This is a particularly blunt statement of the two cultures problem; but I have 
heard enough less blunt statements to become convinced that the problem is real.
9
 I do 
not mean to suggest that this adversarial stance comes only from the military side. On 
the contrary, I believe that the phenomena that bother Professor Dinstein are real, 
even if his rhetoric is exaggerated and unusually belligerent. The phenomena on the 
side of humanitarian lawyers include an aggressive overreading of humanitarian 
                                                
7
 Ibid. 
8
  Ibid., at 493. 
9
 For example, an eminent British lawyer recollected to me that the British government had been 
persuaded to issue the UK Military Manual (which had been stalled in the bureaucracy) because the 
ICRC was about to issue its own study of customary international humanitarian law and ‘we needed to 
get in our retaliation in advance’. 
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protections in IHL, a tendency to presume that civilian casualties are probably 
unlawful, and occasional double standards in who gets singled out for criticism.  
2. Lawyers as advisors 
The cleavage between visions of the law not only mirrors the cleavage in 
professional cultures, the two reinforce each other. Organizational cultures are 
interpretive communities; lawyers in them develop their own lore about what the law 
means and how to read it.  
That generates a problem for the professional responsibilities of lawyers. 
Among lawyers’ most important roles is that of legal advisor and what is often labeled 
‘compliance counselor’ who reviews client plans to ensure their legality. In military 
organizations, the advisor’s role appears in several disparate guises. At the upper 
echelons, military lawyers write manuals, directives, and operational handbooks that 
are, in effect, book-length advice on what the law means. Within combat units, 
military lawyers help train soldiers in the laws of war, a rather different form of legal 
advice. And in operations, lawyers provide case by case oral advice to commanders. 
The legal advisor’s basic ethical obligation is to offer independent and candid 
advice on what the law requires—not frivolous advice, not farfetched advice, and 
above all not advice that simply tells the client what he wants to hear.
10
 A lawyer who 
blesses whatever transactions the client wants to undertake, and in the process writes a 
get-out-of-jail-free card for the client, is an unethical lawyer. 
 The problem is that the two visions of the law of war reflect a practical 
indeterminacy in the law, in which military lawyers and humanitarian lawyers 
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 In U.S. ethics rules, the governing standard is that of ABA Model Rule 2.1, ‘Advisor’: ‘In 
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid 
advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation’. Related 
rules are 2.3, ‘Evaluation for Use By Third Persons’, the comments to which explain that such an 
evaluation cannot contain statements of fact or law known by the lawyer to be false, and rule 3.1, 
prohibiting lawyers from frivolous factual and legal assertions in judicial proceedings. 
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sometimes systematically disagree about what independent, candid legal advice would 
say.
11
 I call the indeterminacy ‘practical’ in that it would remain a stumbling block 
even if, like Ronald Dworkin, you believe on theoretical grounds that legal questions 
have unique right answers. An answer that cannot persuade someone because her 
interpretive community rejects your basic assumptions will be practically 
indeterminate even if in some ultimate sense it is right.
12
 Interpretive communities set 
the inarticulate boundaries of legitimate legal disagreement, beyond which a legal 
opinion will seem frivolous or even outrageous. But what if the interpretive 
community itself has split into two interpretive communities? Then the views of each 
may seem outrageous to the other. The natural impulse of each will be to reject the 
other’s conclusions more or less wholesale. That creates a problem of what role the 
alternative vision plays in the advice they offer their clients. 
 Legal advising is the most important thing that lawyers do, and lawyer advice, 
rather than judicial decisions, defines the law.
13
  Each year, in hundreds of millions of 
confidential lawyer-client interactions that are almost never reviewed by anyone else, 
lawyers advise their clients about what the law requires of them. These conversations 
are the mosaic tiles that make up the law. Theorists err when they focus on judicial 
decisions as the heart of the law. Think of Holmes’s famous dictum that ‘prophecies 
of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law’.
14
 Judge-centered theorists focus on ‘what the courts will do in fact’, as 
though the courts pervade the law—which they do not, especially in the law of war 
where litigation is extraordinarily sparse. A better reading of Holmes’s dictum notices 
that, literally, he is saying that ‘prophecies of what the courts will do in fact’ are what 
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 K. Anderson, ‘Who Owns the Rules of War?’, NY Times Magazine, Apr 13, 2003, at 38. 
12
 On this point, see J. Waldron, ‘The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity’, in R. George (ed.), Natural 
Law Theory: Contemporary Essays (1992), 158. 
13
 So I have argued in D. Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (2007), at 131-61. 
14
 O. W. Holmes, Jr., ‘The Path of the Law’, (1897) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457. 
 7 
he means by the law. Holmes makes clear that the prophecies he has in mind take 
place in the lawyer’s office, not the courtroom, whenever the lawyer discusses legality 
with her client. This comes closer to recognizing the law-defining role of lawyer 
advice, but even Holmes focuses too much on predicting what judges will do and not 
enough on the lawyer’s own choices—a point that will prove important in what 
follows, where the focus will be very much on lawyers’ own choices. 
 Given the central importance of legal advising to the law itself, the ethics of 
legal advice turns out to have major significance for the integrity of law.
15
 The crucial 
requirement is one I mentioned earlier: the legal advisor is supposed to be candid and 
independent, and the ethical requirement of candor and independence is the same for 
military and civilian lawyers. Candor implies at the very least that the advisor gives 
the client her best interpretation of the law. It may require more than that, because if 
the lawyer’s best interpretation of the law is controversial, and particularly if it 
represents a minority view, the lawyer must alert the client of that fact, for that too is 
part of candor. Independence reinforces the demands of candor: it means not tailoring 
the advice to what the client wants to hear.
16
 The advisor has to have the guts to say 
no to clients, to give them unwelcome legal news. That makes the advisor’s approach 
to legal interpretation very different from the advocate’s. For those of us accustomed 
to thinking of lawyers as courtroom advocates, who resolve every uncertainty in favor 
of their clients and who argue forcefully for whatever interpretation of the law helps 
the client prevail, candor and independence from the client seem like unusual 
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 This is a major them in W. B. Wendel, Lawyers and Fidelity to Law (2010). 
16
 The American Bar Association explains its rule of candor thus: ‘Legal advice often involves 
unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, the 
lawyer endeavors to sustain the client’s morale and may put advice into as acceptable a form as honesty 
permits. However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the 
advice will be unpalatable to the client’. Model Rule 2.1, cmt[1]. I have argued that the rule of thumb 
in practice should be that the lawyer’s advice is more or less the same as it would be if her client 
wanted the opposite outcome from the one she knows her client wants. D. Luban, ‘Tales of Terror: 
Lessons for Lawyers from the “War on Terrorism” ’, in K. Tranter et al. (eds.), Reaffirming Legal 
Ethics: Taking Stock and New Ideas (2010), at 61. 
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requirements.
17
 Yet without them, the law will be twisted and subverted; it will barely 
exist.  
 That was the problem in the notorious ‘torture memos’ written by lawyers in 
the U.S. Department of Justice between 2002 and 2005. They were subsequently 
withdrawn and condemned by the Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility. 
The torture memos dealt with a host of legal issues connected with a dozen brutally 
‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques, and resolved every issue in favor of 
permissibility. The legal reasoning by which the lawyers conjured away the obligation 
not to torture was bizarre. Yet these opinions became the secret law of the land for 
several years, and they created an iron-clad legal defense for the CIA interrogators 
who waterboarded detainees, slammed them into walls, and kept them awake for as 
long as a week, naked and hanging in chains—as well as for the officials who 
authorized these interrogations in full knowledge of what they would involve. 
Ultimately, a prosecutor looking into the torture allegations dropped the investigation 
of 99 out of 101 cases, all but the two interrogators who killed the people they were 
interrogating.  
 Candid, independent legal advice can lead to awkward moments, because the 
lawyer works for the client and understands all too well that strong-willed clients do 
not like Cassandras. In frequently-quoted words, the American lawyer and diplomat 
Elihu Root wrote, ‘The client never wants to be told that he can’t do what he wants to 
do; he wants to be told how to do it, and it is the lawyer’s business to tell him how’.
18
 
                                                
17
  Not so unusual for lawyers in civil law systems, where independence from the client is one of the 
defining principles of legal ethics. German rules, for example, define the lawyer as an ‘independent 
organ of the administration of justice’, and independence means independence from the client as well 
as from the state. 
18
 R. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors, 1819-1947 (1946), vol. 1, at 667. Channeling 
Elihu Root, an Israeli JAG once commented, ‘Our job is to let the army operate’. Quoted in A. Cohen, 
‘Legal Operational Advice in the Israeli Defense Forces: The International Law Department and the 
Changing Nature of International Humanitarian Law’, (2011) 26 Conn. J. Int’l L. 367, at 382-83. U.S. 
 9 
Yet Root also famously remarked: ‘About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists 
in telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop’.
19
 I am not sure 
why Root restricted himself to would-be clients. The same is true of actual clients, 
when they are eager to push boundaries and cut corners and the lawyer’s job is to tell 
them no.  
 The laws of war are, at bottom, constraints on warriors and war-fighting. 
Kennedy disagrees, observing that the laws of war also license violence and war-
fighting.
20
 That is true, but without them, violence would need no legal license; for 
that reason, I disagree that LOAC’s licensing function is as fundamental as its 
constraining function. Lawyers who interpret and enforce the laws of war are 
basically agents of constraint. If they are military lawyers—I will use the American 
expression ‘JAGs’—that places them in an unusual and sometimes awkward position. 
As military officers, JAGs share the military mission of their service. But as lawyers 
occupying the role of compliance counselor, their job is often to put on the brakes, not 
press the accelerator. The tension is obvious. 
JAGs’ double role as military officers and lawyers amplifies the tension. Both 
roles are quintessentially partisan: they demand loyalty to us, to our side. It is hard 
enough for a civilian lawyer with a civilian client to comply with the ethical 
requirement of candid, independent advice. How much harder, then, for a military 
lawyer to veto a tactic or a targeting choice that a superior would like to use. And yet, 
sometimes, that is the JAG’s job. 
                                                                                                                                       
JAGs repeatedly told the same thing to Laura Dickinson. L. A. Dickinson, ‘Military Lawyers on the 
Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International Law Compliance’, (2010) 104 AJIL 1, at 20. 
19
 P. C. Jessup, Elihu Root (1938), vol. 1, at 133. Amichai Cohen’s study of the Israeli Defense Forces’ 
International Law Division also reports instances of ‘courageous young lawyers who stood up to over-
eager commanders, and halted some dangerous and illegal operations’. Cohen, supra note 18, at 382. 
20
 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 167. 
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 To make matters worse, military lawyers must at times overcome the 
suspicion that they are not really part of the band of brothers—or, more insidiously, 
they must deal with their own suspicion that the combat soldiers disdain them as 
‘jobniks’ rather than warriors even when that is not true.
21
 That provides additional 
temptation for them to over-identify with their clients even when their professional 
duty calls for independence.   
 One question is what countervailing resources are available to JAGs to resist 
these multiple pressures. That, unfortunately, is a topic for a different paper. My 
question is whether they should resist the pressures at all, if the laws of war provide a 
valid (if controversial) case that what commanders want to do is legal. 
 It is here that the cultural divide within the law of war and the lawyers who 
interpret it becomes significant.  The LOAC version of the laws of war is, as we shall 
see, less restrictive of combat activities than the IHL version, and systematically so. A 
military lawyer will find that the LOAC version lessens the strains of commitment. 
Even better, it does so without veering into the moral twilight zone of the torture 
lawyers, because the LOAC version is not frivolous, and in fact not particularly 
extreme. The professional community of military lawyers is not a band of zealots 
pushing an ideology. Its jurisprudence is more conservative than that of humanitarian 
lawyers, but it does not rest on eccentric or fantastic premises. 
I have said that what makes this a real question is practical indeterminacy in 
the laws of war, making them susceptible to systematically inconsistent 
                                                
21
 See Dickinson, supra note 18, at 18-19, discussing U.S. JAGs’ self-perception of the importance of 
convincing soldiers and officers that they belong to their common culture. Dickinson also quotes JAGs 
who were aware of the danger of over-identification, and who criticized a JAG who ‘went native’ by 
not reporting war crimes by members of his unit, because ‘his loyalty to the command trumped his 
ethical duty [in his own mind], and because he was in combat with them’. Ibid., at 26. 
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interpretations. But is there such indeterminacy? To explore this question, it will be 
useful to describe the two visions of the law of war in more detail.
22
 
Before doing so, let me preview the argument to follow. After examining the 
two visions of the law of war to explain their systematic differences, I highlight one 
feature of the IHL vision, which I call the ‘civilianization’ of the law of war, by which 
I mean the assumption that civilian interests matter as much as military interests and 
that, as a consequence, humanitarians have as much claim to the laws of war as 
militaries. In the final section, I argue that military necessity, properly understood, is 
itself an inherently civilianized concept, in the sense that it takes civilian interests into 
account. This section traces the evolution of the concept of military necessity, and 
argues that claims of military necessity are implicit proportionality claims that the 
marginal military advantage of an option over alternatives that offer more protection 
to civilians outweighs the marginal damage to civilians. This creates the possibility of 
convergence between the two visions, or so I suggest in the conclusion. 
3. The LOAC vision 
3.1. Taking necessity seriously.  
The LOAC vision begins, innocuously enough, with the premise that in fact an 
armed conflict is going on—the regulation of armed conflict presumes armed conflict. 
Armed conflict is a serious enterprise, and the law of war presupposes that states and 
organizations engage in it for serious reasons. That won’t always be true, and wars 
have often been waged for despicable reasons. But the law of war presupposes the 
opposite. Otherwise, there would be little point in regulating war, and no point in 
making rules for war fighters who are not assumed to be serious moral agents. The 
                                                
22
 For a related version of the LOAC vision of law, see K. Anderson, ‘The Role of the U.S. Military 
Lawyer in Projecting a Vision of the Laws of War’, (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 443. Anderson proposes 
that the moral vision shared by U.S. military lawyers consists in a commitment to winning (what I am 
calling ‘military necessity’) coupled with a commitment to sovereign democratic governance. Ibid. at 
445. 
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LOAC vision presupposes that the war fighters, as the primary audience of the laws of 
war, are deeply serious moral agents. That requires taking their job seriously and not 
simply denouncing the destruction it causes.  
 Warfare imposes its own physical and spiritual demands, what the 1880 
Oxford Handbook (quoting Jomini) called ‘inexorable necessities’.
23
 If the enterprise 
is a morally serious one, its inexorable necessities are equally serious, and the law of 
war cannot wish them out of existence. Whatever restraints the law imposes must 
accommodate themselves to military necessity and regulate around its margin.  
 That implies that any legal regime that would make it impossible, or even 
inordinately difficult, for fighters to wage war, cannot be serious. If taking the law at 
face value guarantees defeat for one side or the other in advance, then taking the law 
at face value cannot be the right way to interpret it. 
 This is not a merely hypothetical point. To take a current important example, 
the existing law on human shielding arguably violates the stricture of taking military 
necessity seriously. On the one hand, it forbids the use of human shields or the siting 
of military forces among civilians—which, from the point of view of guerrillas or 
partisans, amounts to requiring the fish to leave the water voluntarily, the better to 
become prey for the fishermen. On the other hand, the law requires militaries 
confronted by an enemy that (illegally) uses human shields to maintain the principle 
of distinction, which would very likely require them to refrain from attacking 
partisans deeply embedded in a civilian population. The law may have looked like a 
plausible compromise to those who negotiated the treaties, but in reality it creates 
requirements that neither side can honor without accepting defeat. 
                                                
23
 Oxford Laws of War on Land (1880)(quoting Jomini), 
wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Oxford_Laws_of_War_on_Land. 
 13 
 Terrible things happen in wars. The point of the laws of war cannot be to 
abolish those terrible things. The point can only be to shrink them to what is 
necessary, where, awful as it is, necessity always means someone else’s tears.
24
 Any 
sane person wholeheartedly wishes that war itself could somehow be made 
unnecessary, but if that ever happens we will no longer need to talk about the law of 
war. So long as the law of war remains a subject matter, it must take necessity 
seriously. 
3.2. Treaty interpretation. 
 Taking Necessity Seriously carries implications for the way legal language 
gets interpreted. Treaties are agreements among states, and the LOAC vision 
presumes (perhaps only as a rule of thumb or a guiding hunch) that states would never 
give away powers that enable them to wage war successfully.
25
 Thus, treaty language 
should be interpreted narrowly and formalistically. Interpreters must not fill gaps in 
humanitarian protections, because gaps are signs that the contracting parties, the 
states, never reached agreement on the subject and chose to retain their own 
unfettered discretion.
26
 
 Legal theorists often contrast narrowly formalist interpretation with so-called 
purposive or teleological interpretation—interpreting language through the lens of 
                                                
24
 On this seemingly obvious point, surprisingly often ignored, see H. Shue, ‘Laws of War’, in S. 
Besson & J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (2010), 511-16. ‘I think the 
fundamental attitude of the laws of war … can be well captured with the contemporary pithy phrase 
“shit happens”. We are dealing with war…. The purpose of the laws of war is to constrain the “shit” 
when the “shit” happens’. Ibid. at 516. It is still shit. 
25
 M. N. Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the 
Delicate Balance’, (2010) 50 Va. J. Int’l L. 795, at 799. 
26
  For an example of reasoning of the sort described here, see J. B. Bellinger III & W. J. Haynes II, ‘A 
US government response to the International Committee of the Red Cross study Customary 
International Humanitarian Law’, (2007) 89 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 443, at 453: ‘These limitations in 
treaty provisions…are not inadvertent, but reflect … legitimate State and military concerns, making it 
very unlikely that States would acquiesce in the overbroad principle depicted in the rule [proposed by 
the ICRC]’. 
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whatever purpose the legal instrument was supposed to serve.
27
 One might guess that 
lawyers adhering to the LOAC vision will be skeptical of purposive interpretation, 
and they sometimes are, when the interpreter appears to be going off on a 
humanitarian tear, filling in treaty gaps that (military lawyers believe) the states-
parties left in the treaties for a reason. However, nothing in the LOAC vision is in 
principle hostile to purposive interpretation. The real difference lies in what you take 
the purpose of laws of war to be. Is it to protect civilians, even at cost to military 
effectiveness, or is it to give full sway to military necessity and protect civilians 
(only) against military excess? Military lawyers assume the latter; it is part and parcel 
of Taking Necessity Seriously. So even using purposive interpretation, they will be 
reluctant to fill treaty gaps in civilian protections. 
 For example, consider the differences between Additional Protocols I and II of 
the Geneva Conventions (1977). AP I was a milestone in the legal regulation of war, 
because it codifies the basic jus in bello rules for protecting civilians (the principles of 
distinction and proportionality). However, by its terms AP I applies only in 
international armed conflicts and anti-colonialist struggles (article 1). AP II applies to 
non-international armed conflicts like civil wars, and it too prohibits making civilians 
the ‘object of attack’ (article 13). Unlike AP I, however, it provides no detailed rules 
protecting civilians, for example rules requiring warnings and prohibiting excessive 
collateral damage. Overall, AP II is briefer, leaner, and far more perfunctory than AP 
I. Furthermore, AP II applies only to a subset of non-international armed conflicts, 
those where the non-state party actually controls territory.  
                                                
27
  In international doctrine, textualism and purposivism are co-equal, as evidenced by the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 31(1): ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. 
 15 
Clearly, the states negotiating the two Protocols were much less generous in 
protecting civilians during civil wars than in international armed conflicts; it seems 
likely that they wanted great latitude to put down rebellions. A treaty interpreter in the 
LOAC vision would be skeptical of efforts to imply the civilian protection rules of AP 
I into AP II; and she would emphasize that neither Protocol applies to an uprising 
where the rebels control no territory. In a conflict not explicitly covered by either 
Protocol, anything goes except for gratuitous savagery. If the jus in bello rules in the 
Additional Protocols are taken to represent customary international law, or if their 
widespread acceptance can be said to constitute it, the same difference would exist 
between the customary rules applicable in international and non-international armed 
conflicts. 
The IHL vision, by contrast, is deeply reluctant ever to concede that anything 
goes, and is more likely to blur the treaty lines that LOAC lawyers highlight. The 
authors of the ICRC’s massive study of customary international humanitarian law 
complain that ‘[c]ommon sense would suggest that such rules [as those in AP I], and 
the limits they impose on the way war is waged, should be equally applicable in 
international and non-international armed conflicts’.
28
 They continue: ‘The fact that in 
2001 the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons was amended to extend its 
scope to non-international armed conflicts is an indication that this notion is gaining 
currency within the international community’.
29
 A lawyer in the LOAC vision would 
cite the same evidence to reach the opposite conclusion: the fact that states amended 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons but not the Additional Protocols 
shows that they were not prepared to import AP I standards into AP II, or into parallel 
rules of customary international law. The UK Ministry of Defence’s Manual of the 
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Law of Armed Conflict recognizes that LOAC applies in internal as well as interstate 
armed conflicts, but immediately notes: ‘Different rules apply to these different 
situations’.
30
 
3.3. Customary international law 
 Besides treaties, customary international law is the main source of the laws of 
war. The definition of customary international law is ‘a general practice accepted as 
law’ or, in another influential formulation, ‘a general and consistent practice of states 
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation’.
31
 Beginning law students are 
taught that customary international law therefore has two elements, state practice and 
opinio juris (the sense of legal obligation). Those who claim that a rule belongs to 
customary international law must demonstrate both elements.  
 The tricky part of customary international law is that no automatic way exists 
to tell if a rule has attained customary status. Interpreters may disagree about whether 
non-unanimous state practice has achieved sufficient ‘density’ to be labeled a general 
practice, or whether states undertake niceties out of a sense of legal obligation or for 
other reasons. More than any other part of law, customary international law exists (or 
not) in the pronouncements of experts reading the tea leaves of diplomatic practice. 
The issue is, one might say, interpretive all the way down. That it makes it ripe for 
duels between experts. 
 A noteworthy illustration is the controversy between the United States 
government and the ICRC over the latter’s customary international humanitarian law 
study—a milestone of the IHL vision of the laws of war. The study took ten years and 
involved hundreds of researchers canvassing state practice and opinio juris. The final 
product includes a volume of rules accompanied by two volumes of supporting 
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documentation, and it weighs in at 4,500 pages. Soon after it was published, however, 
the U.S. State Department’s Legal Adviser John Bellinger and the General Counsel of 
the Defense Department, William Haynes, wrote a skeptical letter to the ICRC. They 
complained that the state practice cited by ICRC is ‘insufficiently dense’; that it 
places too much emphasis on written materials like military manuals, ‘as opposed to 
actual operational practice by States during armed conflict’; that it gives ‘undue 
weight to statements by non-governmental organizations and the ICRC itself’; that it 
does not give due regard to the practice of ‘specially affected States’ and ‘tends to 
regard as equivalent the practice of States that have relatively little history of 
participation in armed conflict and the practice of States that have had a greater extent 
and depth of experience...’.
32
  
Now, the last of these complaints might be discounted as special pleading for 
American exceptionalism. But overall, the Bellinger/Haynes article reflects the 
concern by military lawyers that humanitarian lawyers overreach in announcing 
customary international law and ignore actual military practice in favor of 
documents—and this concern is hardly special pleading. 
3.4. The very nature of international law 
 Military lawyers have states as clients, and the LOAC vision of international 
law is statist in the traditional fashion represented by the 1927 Lotus dictum: ‘rules of 
law binding upon States…emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law’.
33
 
Period. The LOAC vision is skeptical of claims that states’ wills can be constrained 
by supposedly higher standards—‘progressive’ trends and tendencies, generalizations 
and extrapolations, jus cogens, and especially pronouncements by activist tribunals 
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and NGOs.
34
 Thus, the UK Ministry of Defence recognizes only two sources of 
LOAC, customary law and treaty law, both of which depend on state consent.
35
 Under 
the LOAC vision, a state that has not bought into a standard remains unbound 
regardless of what the NGOs or the IHL experts say. 
3.5. Deference and discretion 
 One important consequence of Taking Necessity Seriously is that military 
lawyers want to leave the judgment calls about what is necessary to military 
commanders, without after-the-fact second guessing by courts, investigating 
commissions, or Human Rights Watch, whose proper role should be condemning 
clearcut violations.  
Consider proportionality calculations, which under the law require weighing 
the concrete and direct military advantage of an operation against the anticipated 
‘incidental’ damage to civilians and civilian objects. Everyone understands that 
‘calculations’ in a literal sense are out of the question. Different observers will assign 
different weights to military advantages and evaluate risks to civilian objects 
differently. For military lawyers, it is self-evident that commanders enjoy broad 
discretion and deserve significant deference. Military lawyers vigorously object to ex 
post second-guessing of command decisions.
36
 
 Here is an example of the kind of second-guessing that bothers military 
lawyers: In the ICTY’s 2011 Gotovina decision, the Trial Chamber found that a 
Croatian artillery officer named Rajčić?indiscriminately shelled a city by firing at the 
enemy commander’s apartment in a civilian neighborhood. General Ante Gotovina, 
who had ordered Rajčić to shell?the?city, drew a 24 year sentence for war crimes. 
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The Trial Chamber has found above that firing at Martić’s apartment could 
disrupt his ability to move, communicate, and command and so offered a 
definite military advantage. Rajčić?recognized that the chance of hitting or 
injuring Martić?by firing artillery at his building was very slight. Rajčić?
testified that the HV [Hrvataska Vojska, the Croatian army] sought to harass 
and put pressure on Martić?and that the HV took the rules of distinction and of 
proportionality into account when deciding whether to target the apartment 
block. The Trial Chamber considers that Martić’s apartment was located in an 
otherwise civilian apartment building …. At the times of firing, namely 
between 7:30 and 8 a.m. and in the evening on 4 August 1995, civilians could 
have reasonably been expected to be present on the streets …. Firing twelve 
shells of 130 millimetres at Martić’s apartment and an unknown number of 
shells of the same calibre at the area marked R on P2337, from a distance of 
approximately 25 kilometres, created a significant risk of a high number of 
civilian casualties and injuries, as well as of damage to civilian objects. The 
Trial Chamber considers that this risk was excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage of firing at the two locations where the HV 
believed Martić?to have been present. This disproportionate attack shows that 
the HV paid little or no regard to the risk of civilian casualties and injuries and 
damage to civilian objects when firing artillery at a military target ….
37
 
For military lawyers, it is outrageous for the Trial Chamber to second-guess a field 
commander’s?risk-benefit assessment on such a fact-intensive and situation-sensitive 
decision. Who were the judges to decide how important it was to disrupt Martić’s 
‘ability to move, control, and command’—which even the Trial Chamber calls a 
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‘definite military advantage’—or how likely the shelling was to injure civilians and 
civilian objects, or how to weigh the military advantages against the risks?
38
 
 It goes almost without saying that under the LOAC vision, external 
accountability for law of war violations is undesirable; state militaries should be relied 
upon to police their own. Universal jurisdiction is particularly deplorable, not to 
mention inadequately supported by state practice and opinio juris. This outlook 
represents more than military lawyers’ professional protectiveness of their clients, and 
adoption of the clients’ point of view (although that is undeniable). The mistrust of 
external accountability rests on principle, and flows from the conviction that military 
commanders deserve deference and discretion for decisions they make in the fog of 
war. The fog of war is one of the ‘inexorable necessities’ that the law cannot wish out 
of existence. 
3.6 Human rights 
 In the LOAC vision, human rights don’t have much to do with the laws of 
war. Historically, the laws of war evolved along a separate track that pre-dates human 
rights law. That separate track comes from two sources: centuries-old traditions of 
chivalry and martial honor, and humanitarianism, meaning the desire to alleviate 
suffering. Humanitarianism has little to do with human rights; its source is 
compassion and pity, not recognition of individuals as rights-bearers. Its philosophical 
motivation is the Benthamite desire to diminish pain and suffering, not the Kantian 
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injunction to respect human dignity. Human rights law is for peacetime, and the 
LOAC vision emphasizes the laws of war as lex specialis, ‘special law’ that displaces 
more general law under the rule of specialty.
39
 That means it displaces human rights 
law whenever peace gives way to war. 
 Military lawyers hewing to the LOAC vision also emphasize the stringent 
jurisdictional restrictions in major human rights instruments, which underline that 
human rights are meant to bind governments within their own territory, not in foreign 
wars. For example, article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights reads: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant… (emphasis added). 
The Covenant does not obligate a belligerent state outside the territory and 
jurisdiction of the state.
40
 
 The point is not that military lawyers denigrate human rights and human rights 
law. They do not. It is that they doubt its relevance in armed conflict, and see little 
conceptual or historical connection between human rights law and LOAC. 
 To summarize, the LOAC vision takes necessity seriously, favors wide 
discretion and deference to military commanders in judgment calls, reads treaties 
narrowly and formalistically under the assumption that states gave up as little as they 
could when negotiating them, interprets customary international law through a 
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‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ about humanitarian overclaiming, adopts a statist view of 
international law, and doubts the relevance of human rights law to the laws of war. 
Military necessity is the keystone of the arch: all the other elements make sense 
because the necessities of combat are inexorable, and military lawyers regard LOAC 
as interstitial and narrow—a body of law designed to infuse the ‘principle of 
humanity’ into the conduct of war, but only in those places that states are willing to 
let it impinge on military necessity. 
4. The IHL vision 
 Where military necessity forms the unshakeable foundation of the LOAC 
vision, human rights and human dignity lie at the basis of the IHL vision.  As the 
ICTY put it in its Furundzija judgment, 
The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as 
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every 
person…. The general principle of respect for human dignity is . . . the very 
raison d'etre of international humanitarian law and human rights law; indeed 
in modern times it has become of such paramount importance as to permeate 
the whole body of international law.
41
 
That does not mean that the IHL vision fixates on the rather specialized and technical 
body of human rights law, although as we will see the IHL vision gives human rights 
law a far larger place than the LOAC vision accepts. The point is rather that the IHL 
vision begins with individual human beings caught up against their will in a war—
human beings who simply want to go about their daily business and whose human 
dignity confers upon them a right to do so without being blown up, maimed, brain 
damaged, driven from the ruins of their homes, or forced to bury their children. The 
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aim of IHL is to secure them, to the maximum extent possible, against the violence 
and indignity of war—violence and indignity that the LOAC vision never minimizes. 
IHL offers a civilian’s-eye view of war, and gives ground grudgingly to claims of 
military necessity. Where legal restrictions operate in the margins of military 
necessity under the LOAC vision, IHL strains to relegate war to the margins of 
peacetime rights. As a result, its mode of legal interpretation is maximalist in just 
those places—the restraints and obligations of warriors—that LOAC is minimalist, 
and minimalist in the places that LOAC is maximalist: in discretion and deference to 
the military. Largely, both sets of lawyers read and accept the same body of 
jurisprudence, and both of them admit that war and human dignity belong to the 
human world. But they reach different conclusions because they assign military 
necessity and human dignity different logical priority. 
 A paradigm example of the IHL vision appears in one of the first decisions of 
the ICTY, the Tadić case. ICTY had a problem. Its statute empowers it to prosecute 
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, but grave breaches are defined only in 
international armed conflicts, and the Bosnian conflict was a civil war. If ICTY 
accepted the non-international character of the Bosnian war, it would be unable to 
prosecute one of its own statute’s principal categories of crimes. A formalist reading 
of the Statute lends itself to that conclusion, and the principle that ambiguous criminal 
statutes must be construed in favor of the defendant reinforces that reading.  
Instead, ICTY read the law broadly rather than narrowly. It devised a novel 
legal test of state control of military forces to conclude that the war was really an 
international armed conflict between Bosnia and Serbia. More noteworthy than the 
conclusion (which, legal novelty or not, accurately described reality on the ground) 
 24 
was the reasoning. The Appeals Chamber explained that its conclusion is based not 
only on the letter but the spirit of the Geneva Conventions, and 
is borne out by the entire logic of international humanitarian law. This body of 
law is not grounded on formalistic postulates. It is not based on the notion that 
only those who have the formal status of State organs, i.e., are members of the 
armed forces of a State, are duty bound …. Rather, it is a realistic body of law, 
grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring 
deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible.
42
 
 The mode of interpretation employs the so-called ‘Principle of Effectiveness’ 
holding that legal instruments aiming to protect people’s basic rights must be 
interpreted to make them effective at achieving their object and purpose. In its 1989 
Soering decision, the European Court of Human Rights wrote: 
In interpreting the Convention regard must be had to its special character as a 
treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Thus, the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for 
the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be 
interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. In 
addition, any interpretation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed has to be 
consistent with ‘the general spirit of the Convention…’.
43
 
Soering treats the European Convention on Human Rights as an evolving document, 
one that expands its protections to fill gaps. Tadić treats humanitarian law exactly the 
same way. It appeals to the ‘spirit’ and ‘logic’ of humanitarian law. This is precisely 
the kind of gap-filling interpretation of legal instruments that lawyers in the LOAC 
vision reject. They see treaties as agreements representing the will of their parties, 
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nothing more, not clauses in a ‘living constitution’. But for the IHL vision, human 
rights are different, special, and constitutional in their status. 
 Recall that adherents to the LOAC vision assume that states negotiating law of 
war treaties would never have given away war fighting powers that matter to them. 
The IHL vision understands the history of humanitarian treaties differently, as 
manifestations of states’ desire—or at least the desire of important state 
constituencies—to break with the horrifying past. To suppose that governments and 
their Geneva delegates were uniformly hard-liners and realists (in the international-
relations sense) begs the question, misunderstands politics, and falsifies a complex 
history. 
 The IHL vision of customary international law also differs dramatically from 
the LOAC vision. First of all, the roster of agents whose practice and opinio juris 
contribute to law formation has expanded to include international organizations like 
the UN Secretariat and the ICRC. As the ICRC points out, both have legal 
personality, and both have a military role: the Secretariat controls UN military forces, 
and the ICRC ‘has received an official mandate from States “to work for the faithful 
application of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and … to 
prepare any development thereof” ’.
44
 Formalism aside, the Secretariat and the ICRC 
have institutional commitments to protecting civilians, and in the IHL vision that 
commitment belongs at the table in the formation of customary international law. 
But the UN Secretariat and ICRC are hardly the only non-state actors who 
contribute to customary international law. The IHL vision recognizes that the process 
of international lawmaking has evolved substantially from the narrow statism of 
Lotus. Lawmaking now rightfully includes many actors, including international 
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organizations and tribunals and NGOs. States may have created the IOs and tribunals, 
but in creating them, states endowed their creatures with the power to speak law on 
their own.
45
 So too, NGO arguments operate indirectly by pressuring states to respond 
to them, but this gives them a genuine role in the formation of opinio juris.
46
 
The IHL vision is therefore willing to include a variety of soft law instruments 
from multiple sources as evidence of opinio juris; and it treats official state 
statements—verbal practice as opposed to practice on the ground—as law-generative 
state practice.
47
 After all, the practice on the ground might represent lawbreaking 
rather than lawmaking, so there is no reason to privilege it over states’ statements of 
the principles they stand for.
48
 Of course states’ anodyne pro-humanitarian statements 
may be public relations hypocrisy, but that makes them no less a form of state 
practice. The maxim that hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue is never truer 
than in diplomacy, and paying homage to virtue is a form of state practice, as old as 
the state itself. The fact that a state practice is insincere does not weaken it as a source 
of customary international law.  
In the same way that the IHL vision uses more expansive methods of treaty 
interpretation than the LOAC vision, it is more expansive in the domain of state 
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practice and opinio juris it canvasses to identify customary international law. 
International courts and tribunals have ratified the methods favored by the IHL vision, 
and that means the IHL vision has gained a foothold in positive law—it is not simply 
wish-fulfillment fantasies of humanitarian reformers.
49
  
To be sure, there has been pushback against giving too much credence to soft 
law as a source of customary international law. Almost thirty years ago, Prosper Weil 
warned that ‘the accumulation of nonlaw or prelaw is no more sufficient to create law 
than is thrice nothing to make something’.
50
 A decade later, Bruno Simma and Philip 
Alston criticized ‘a cultured pearl version of customary international law’ that 
operates ‘through proclamation, exhortation, repetition, incantation, lament’.
51
 But 
traditionalist warnings like these miss the jurisprudential argument behind the IHL 
vision, which is that international law rightfully responds to broader constituencies 
than states. Legal accountability has become more pluralist and more populist than in 
the traditional state-centered view of international law. Today accountability runs to 
multiple institutions—public, semi-public, and private—which serve as surrogates for 
accountability to people. Accountability implies obligation,
52
 and obligation is the 
calling card of law. This is a point of decisive importance, to which I return shortly. 
LOAC lawyers are ‘legal centralists’, a name for the jurisprudential school 
that recognizes only state-made law as genuine law; and they are positivists, granting 
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legal validity only to norms that can trace their pedigree back to state consent. In IHL 
jurisprudence, legal centralism and positivism give way to legal pluralism, the view 
that even the most advanced societies contain multiple legal systems, some state-made 
but others not. IHL lawyers view international law as a pluralist system where states 
have lost their exclusive authority over the rule of recognition for customary 
international law. In the current environment the rule of recognition for international 
law is itself up for grabs, and under the IHL vision a progressive trajectory in state 
verbal practice and opinio juris can be taken up by other articulators of law to 
demonstrate the emergence of new rules of customary international law. 
Observers commonly attribute this change to the human rights revolution and 
its consequences. The shift away from the classical state-centered picture of 
sovereignty began when the Nuremberg Charter stripped away the act-of-state and 
obedience-to-law defenses and penalized crimes against humanity ‘whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated’. It continued with the 
formation of the United Nations and the emergence of modern jus cogens norms. 
More recently, it manifested itself in the proposal that sovereignty is conditional on 
protecting the human rights of the state’s people, an interpretation suggested in 1999 
by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
53
 Once we subordinate state sovereignty 
to human rights norms, the consensualist theory of international law becomes at best 
incomplete and at worst incoherent. 
In contrast to the LOAC vision, the IHL vision of human rights law perceives 
a strong connection with the laws of war. As we have seen, the LOAC vision rejects 
the application of human rights law in wartime as inconsistent with existing law and 
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untrue to the very different historical paths on which the two branches of law have 
evolved. To both objections IHL has a response.
54
 To begin with, the major law of 
war treaties incorporate what are plainly human rights protections. The most obvious 
is common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, frequently and correctly described 
as a mini-human rights convention embedded in Geneva. The same goes for Article 
75 of Additional Protocol I, which offers a schedule of human rights protections for 
‘persons who do not benefit from more favorable treatment under the Conventions or 
under this Protocol’. The Geneva edifice of ‘more favorable treatment’ therefore rests 
on a conceptual floor of basic human rights. 
Furthermore, IHL proponents can point to the ICJ’s holding that the 
‘protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war …’.
55
 unless states 
expressly derogate from it—and they cannot derogate from the most basic human 
rights. To be sure, the ICJ also points out that the law of war, as lex specialis, defines 
the meaning of human rights in wartime: the rights against arbitrary deprivation of life 
and liberty will be weaker in time of war because killing and imprisonment that would 
be ‘arbitrary’ in peacetime may not be arbitrary under laws of war that take necessity 
seriously. But even with that important qualification, the ICJ conceptualizes the law 
of war as an interpretive guide to the law of human rights rather than a substitute for 
it. Human rights law may provide lesser protections in wartime than in peacetime, but 
its obligations don’t go away, and the lex specialis never supplants them. 
What about the explicit jurisdictional limitation on the ICCPR? IHL reads the 
treaty language differently from the LOAC interpretation, under which the 
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Convention applies only within a state’s own territory or jurisdiction. IHL reads it as 
indicated by the brackets I have inserted in the jurisdiction clause: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes [to respect] and [to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction] 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant…. 
On this reading, the territorial and jurisdictional limitation applies only to the 
obligation to ensure human rights, not the obligation to respect human rights, that is, 
not to violate them. Nor is this a strained reading. It makes sense that states can be 
expected to ensure human rights only on territory they control, but it also makes sense 
that they can respect human rights (by not violating them) anywhere. On the 
alternative LOAC reading, the requirement to respect rights, restricted to a state’s 
territory or jurisdiction, becomes redundant: Why include an obligation to respect 
rights if you already have an obligation to ensure rights? You cannot ensure rights if 
you are violating them. The virtue of the IHL reading is that by giving the duty to 
respect a wider scope than the duty to ensure, it makes the duty to respect non-
redundant and, as lawyers like to say, it gives effect to every word of the treaty 
language.
56
 Thus, the IHL reading is better on textual grounds and entirely plausible 
on policy grounds. The ICRC and the European Court of Human Rights believe that 
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subject to its jurisdiction’. 
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human rights law applies whenever a belligerent state obtains ‘effective control’ over 
an area, regardless of formal tests of territorial jurisdiction.
57
 
 Finally, the IHL vision does not defer to the judgment of military 
commanders. That would defeat the whole point of legal accountability. Deference to 
military commanders making life-and-death decisions in the fog of war signifies more 
than rightful acknowledgment of military necessity. It also means allowing whatever 
slack commanders cut themselves to define the common law for interpreting IHL 
standards. Deference also means trusting commanders to tell the truth about what 
guided their decisions, under circumstances where they have everything to gain by 
lying. Recently, for example, a U.S. military court acquitted the last suspect in the 
2005 killing of unarmed civilians at Haditha, Iraq of the most serious charges. A news 
account offers an explanation gleaned from interviews with military law experts: 
The Haditha case also fits another pattern: Many cases involving civilian 
deaths arise during the chaos of combat or shortly afterward, when fighters’ 
emotions are running high; they can later argue that they feared they were still 
under attack and shot in self-defense. 
In those so-called fog-of-war cases, the military and its justice system 
have repeatedly shown an unwillingness to second-guess the decisions made 
by fighters who said they believed they were in danger, specialists say.
58
 
The acquittal rate is high in U.S. trials for war crimes committed in combat zones as 
compared with comparable conduct outside of battle.
59
 
 The phenomenon is by no means an American one: NATO has steadfastly 
refused to investigate civilian deaths in NATO bombings in Libya, including an attack 
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that reportedly killed 34 civilians (wounding 38).
60
 NATO claimed that all targets 
were military, but in a few cases a UN investigating commission was unable to find 
any evidence that this was so, and recommended an investigation.
61
 
 The Gotovina decision quoted earlier helps illustrate what is at stake. Even 
though the Tribunal appears to second-guess the artillery officer’s proportionality 
decision, it turns out that the Tribunal really based its decision on something less 
controversial: it simply didn’t believe Rajčić, and concluded that Gotovina had 
ordered Rajčić ‘to treat whole towns… as targets when firing artillery projectiles’.
62
 
The Tribunal treats Rajčić’s disproportionate shelling as one among several pieces of 
evidence leading to that conclusion, and it uses its own proportionality analysis not to 
substitute for Rajčić’s judgment, but to conclude that Rajčić was lying when he 
testified that he ‘took the rules of distinction and of proportionality into account’.
63
 
 Humanitarian lawyers believe that international law is already too deferential 
to military commanders. As a case in point, consider the report of a committee 
established by the ICTY prosecutor to review the NATO bombing campaign in the 
Kosovo war for possible war crimes. The committee used a relaxed standard of 
evidence: ‘credible evidence tending to show that crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal may have been committed in Kosovo’.
64
 Under that standard, one would 
surely guess that borderline cases would be referred for further investigation. But one 
would guess wrong. In fact, the committee resolved every debatable case in favor of 
NATO, and in the end it recommended no investigations at all.  
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In one instance, a pilot was assigned to bomb a bridge. Too late to stop the 
bomb, he realized that a train was rolling onto the bridge, and his bomb hit the train. 
He nevertheless decided to complete his mission by circling back to drop a second 
bomb, which also hit the train. At least ten passengers were killed and another 15 
injured. The Committee ‘had divided views concerning the attack with the second 
bomb in relation to whether there was an element of recklessness….Despite this, the 
committee is in agreement that…this incident should not be investigated’.
65
 In another 
instance, NATO bombed a Belgrade television station, killing 10-17 people, in order 
to ‘interrupt broadcasting for a brief period’.
66
 NATO argued that the bombing was 
justified in part because the station was broadcasting propaganda. The most the 
committee could say was that ‘if the attack on the RTS was justified by reference to 
its propaganda purpose alone, its legality might well be questioned by some experts in 
the field of international humanitarian law’.
67
 It is hard to imagine a more timid 
assertion than this, which declines to draw any legal conclusion at all in the 
committee’s own name. To IHL lawyers, the decision to open no investigations of 
NATO is a poster child of how badly deference to military decisions undermines 
accountability. 
As for universal jurisdiction, IHL lawyers think it is an indispensible 
complement to states’ own spotty and self-serving efforts at accountability, and a 
powerful incentive to reluctant state militaries to investigate their own. Universal 
jurisdiction has a firm foundation in the Geneva Conventions, substantial state 
practice, and at least some support within the International Court of Justice.
68
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 At this point we can summarize the main features of the IHL vision in parallel 
to the summary offered earlier of the LOAC vision. The IHL vision takes human 
dignity seriously in the way that the LOAC vision takes necessity seriously: as a fixed 
parameter within which the law of war regulates. It grants commanders narrow 
discretion and little deference, reads treaties to fill gaps in the protection of civilians, 
expands the role of non-state actors and soft law in forming customary international 
law, favors legal pluralism over statism as the proper account of jurisprudence, and 
gives wide scope to human rights law even in armed conflict. 
5. The indeterminacy problem 
5.1. Indeterminacy and the ethics of legal advice 
 At this point, the indeterminacy problem should be clear. The problem is not 
that humanitarian lawyers and military lawyers often arrive at different answers to 
vexed legal questions, for example the permissibility of targeted killings or how to 
deal with voluntary human shields. The problem is that the modes of argument 
themselves differ systematically, because the LOAC and IHL visions represent 
coherent systems of jurisprudence that turn on different Archimedean points, military 
necessity or human rights and human dignity.  
This is bad news for those who find one vision of the laws of war vastly more 
compelling than its rival. It’s straightforward to argue with particular bits of legal 
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reasoning (which does not mean you will win the argument), but much harder to 
argue with axioms and unarticulated background assumptions. It is hardly a secret that 
people who see the world differently are likely to see the law differently as well; and 
perhaps the cultural divide I am describing is nothing more than another manifestation 
of this well-known phenomenon. Even so, its contours are distinctive. 
 In the conflict between the LOAC and IHL visions of the law of war, every 
step of the argument rests on premises (about treaty interpretation, customary law 
formation, the nature of international law, the role of human rights, and deference) 
that the other side rejects on principle; and the principles ultimately rest on the 
premises that I have called Archimedean points: military necessity and human 
dignity.  
 The result is practical indeterminacy—not in the sense that anything goes, that 
any legal answer is as good as any other, but in the more significant sense that the law 
can be understood through either of two structured systems that stand in opposition to 
each other. Both have ample support within recognized sources of law; neither is 
frivolous or tendentious on its face, although of course both can be used tendentiously 
(but all law can be used tendentiously).  
The indeterminacy arises because seemingly discrete doctrinal issues turn out 
not to be discrete at all. Or rather, they are discrete only if you hold constant your 
background assumptions about treaties, customary law, military discretion, sources of 
law, and human rights. But if interpretive communities disagree about the background 
assumptions, there will simply be too many moving parts in play. Perhaps Dworkin’s 
imaginary super-judge Hercules could nail down all the corners simultaneously; but 
Hercules is a fiction, unconstrained by the limitations of mortal men and women 
arguing in real time. In the non-Herculean world, indeterminacy can only be resolved 
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if members of the other interpretive community give you the benefit of the doubt that 
your premises are reasonable enough that they should listen to your argument. Later 
in this article I will recommend exactly that as an approach to the two cultures 
problem. But at this point it is important to see that granting the benefit of the doubt is 
a political and moral choice, not a choice compelled (or ruled out) by a fair reading of 
the law.  
 It follows that a military legal advisor who offers an opinion grounded entirely 
in the LOAC vision has not violated the ethical standards governing the advisor’s 
role, or the craft values of the legal profession. (The same is true of a humanitarian 
lawyer and the IHL vision.) Such an opinion would not fall into the ‘torture memo’ 
category of frivolous, result-driven lawyer games. Hopefully, though, lawyers would 
set their sights higher than non-frivolity. 
  If the opinion comes in the form of an official military manual or other 
authoritative directive, it has the additional advantage of counting—by the IHL 
vision’s own favored criterion—as state practice and opinio juris, and in that way it 
contributes to a more LOAC-oriented version of customary international law, which 
the military lawyer also believes is the correct version. That sounds like a win-win 
solution, hoisting the IHL adversaries, as it were, on their own petard. Insofar as the 
military manual guides JAG advice in combat situations, it also shapes state practice 
on the ground, further embedding the LOAC vision in customary law. An experienced 
military lawyer recommends that military lawyers stay ‘involved in the negotiation 
and discussion of emerging legal norms precisely because it is so vital to maintain 
ownership in the field of humanitarian law’.
69
 What better way to maintain ownership 
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over humanitarian law than to actively shape it according to the LOAC vision?
70
 
5.2. Civilianization of the law of war 
 The problem, it seems to me, lies in the idea that military professionals ought 
to own the laws of war. (Recall Professor Dinstein’s advice: ‘Keep poachers off the 
grass’.) That is like saying that Wall Street ought to own securities regulation. 
Militaries aren’t the only people in the battle space or the only ones war effects. It 
may be that in their origin the laws of war were an honor code for warriors who own 
the battlespace by force of arms—in other words, a concession by the strong to the 
weak, which the weak have by grace and not by right because what matters is not the 
rights of the weak but the power of the strong.  
But that is no longer how most people regard the laws of war. In the past 
decades, war makers have had to come to terms with a political world in which their 
actions fall under the intense scrutiny of media and public opinion—and students of 
Clausewitz understand that public opinion makes or breaks military causes. The 
international tribunals give visible structure and focus to that public opinion, but it 
matters less that war makers might come under the ICC’s jurisdiction (they usually 
won’t) than that they come under CNN’s and YouTube’s jurisdiction. Their deeds 
will be on the Internet within minutes of engagement, captured by cell phones.  
This phenomenon has become a source of frustration to military lawyers, 
because audiences assume that gruesome scenes of dead civilians always mean war 
crimes even when they are nothing of the sort. The lawyers’ complaint is correct, but 
public scrutiny and accountability is a fact of life, and at bottom it represents a larger 
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truth that the complaint overlooks: the civilian world has staked a claim to the laws of 
war that is not going to go away, and that should not go away. The laws of war are 
now common property. 
The implication for military legal advisors is both obvious and easy to 
misunderstand. It is obvious that legal advice is supposed to keep the client out of 
trouble, and that might mean counseling against courses of action that are ‘legal’ 
under LOAC but will look horrific. But I put ‘legal’ in scare-quotes for a reason. Even 
though the lawyer might think that cautionary advice is a concession to prudence or 
politics and not a matter of law, the fact is that the court of public opinion cares about 
civilians and it demands that the law governing battlespaces also care about them, as 
much as it cares about military concerns. To the degree that the IHL version of the 
laws of war articulates concern about civilians that the LOAC version downplays, the 
IHL version sets the legal standard, not only the political standard. 
Earlier I remarked that states have lost their exclusive authority over the rule 
of recognition, and what I meant was the legal pluralists’ point: states no longer have 
a monopoly over law creation (if they ever did), and the rule of recognition in the law 
of war has broadened beyond criteria set by state officials alone. Law recognition is a 
social practice among broader audiences who care about civilian interests as well as 
those of the military. They too must be able to – in Hart’s terminology – take the 
internal point of view on the law.
71
 They are audiences who will hold militaries 
accountable and who shape the political environment of military action.  
The phenomenon I am describing might be called the civilianization of the 
laws of war, by which I mean simply that in the laws of war civilian interests matter 
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as much as military interests. The phenomenon—twenty years ago, Theodore Meron 
called it the ‘humanization of humanitarian law’—is unmistakable, and it is a legal 
phenomenon. It might equally be called the legalization of public opinion. 
Of course, the civilian-military schema is too simple. The people of the state 
fielding the army are also civilians—and they cheer for their own team, care little 
about the enemy’s civilians, and stand firmly against holding their own army 
accountable for legal violations. So the civilianization of the laws of war will be 
uneven and inconsistent. On the other side of the ledger, it would be a disastrous 
mistake to assume that the military client doesn’t care about the human dignity of 
civilians, so the term ‘civilianization’ might be a misnomer that wrongly denigrates 
the consciences of soldiers.  
I will nevertheless stay with the name ‘civilianization’, which singles out the 
important fact that the laws of war have passed from exclusive ownership by warriors 
to joint ownership by the civilians whose fate they determine. As I now argue, the 
civilianization of the laws of war is not simply poaching on LOAC’s fiefdom. 
The reason is that, properly understood, military necessity itself requires 
taking civilian interests into account. Before offering that argument, it is worth 
previewing what it implies: that the indeterminacy may not be as complete as I 
suggested. To the extent the LOAC version treats military necessity as a strictly 
technical limit on humanitarian concerns, it misunderstands military necessity; and, 
understanding it correctly, the possibility exists for convergence between the two 
cultures. 
6. The career of military necessity 
 If the LOAC vision of the laws of war derives from the keystone principle that 
I have called ‘Taking Necessity Seriously’, it is worth our time to examine what 
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military necessity means. As the following discussion demonstrates, the concept has 
evolved over time, and different formulations vary dramatically on key issues: 
whether military necessity is a legal concept or, on the contrary, an extra-legal fact 
that sets the boundary on the legal regulation of warfare; whether ‘necessity’ means 
what the literal language suggests—something unavoidable if war is to be waged 
successfully—or merely whatever the military finds convenient; and, above all, 
whether judgments of military necessity must take civilian interests into account.  
6.1. Legal and extra-legal necessity 
 In medieval just war theory, the principle of necessity ‘meant that the just side 
was permitted to use whatever degree of force was strictly necessary in the particular 
circumstances of the case to bring about victory. Beyond that point, all force became 
unlawful’.
72
 Under this conception, necessity serves both a prohibitive and a licensing 
function. It prohibits gratuitous, wanton violence—unnecessary violence. But it 
licenses all non-gratuitous violence, that is, violence essential to the military goal. In 
Suarez’s words, ‘if an end is permissible, the necessary means to that end are also 
permissible’.
73
 
Medieval theory understood its just war doctrines as natural law, so it makes 
sense to describe both the prohibitive and licensing sides of military necessity as legal 
doctrines, although positivists might put scare-quotes around ‘legal’. But starting with 
Hobbes another way of thinking about the relationship between law and military 
necessity appears. In war, ‘[t]he notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have 
… no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no 
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injustice’.
74
 Military necessity is not a legal concept because in war there are no legal 
concepts.
75
 On the other hand, nothing prevents states from writing rules of warfare 
and agreeing to enforce them either directly or through the indirect mechanism of 
reciprocity. The resulting laws of war are positive, not natural law, because states 
write them on a Hobbesian legal blank slate. And military necessity represents the 
limit of rational regulation—Jomini’s ‘inexorable necessities’ that states cannot 
expect each other to forego. Military necessity therefore lies outside the law.  
The latter view represents the regulation of war in the nineteenth century. 
Consider the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, which explains its aim as follows: 
[H]aving by common agreement fixed the technical limits at which the 
necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity, the 
Undersigned … declare as follows:… 
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much 
as possible the calamities of war; 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of 
men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable; 
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That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity.
76
 
The argument proceeds from a technical analysis of the necessities of war to a state 
agreement to prohibit arms that exceed necessity, as ‘contrary to the laws of 
humanity’. Here, plainly, ‘the necessities of war’ lie outside the purview of the laws 
of humanity, and set the ‘technical’ limits to which ‘the requirements of humanity’ 
must ‘yield’. 
 The most famous expression of this conception of necessity as an extra-legal 
limit to the law is the Prussian military maxim ‘Kriegsraison geht vor Kriegsmanier’: 
the necessities of war (Kriegsraison) take precedence over the rules of war. The 
translation loses the Enlightenment flavor of the maxim, the contrast between raison 
(reason) and manier (manner, style). Military necessity represents reason, which 
uncovers immutable scientific laws—the technical side of military science 
exemplified most famously by Clausewitz—whereas rules of war are merely stylistic. 
Under this doctrine, the licensing function of military necessity remains grounded in 
natural law, but natural law means scientific laws, not moral laws. Ought implies can: 
if it is technically impossible to win the war under a given prohibition, the prohibition 
has no force. As for the prohibitive doctrine of military necessity, it has no grounding 
in natural law at all. In effect, the doctrine of Kriegsraison dismisses law in the name 
of science.  
6.2. The Hostages formulation 
 The main feature of Kriegsraison on which I’m focusing is that it conceives 
military necessity as a limit to the law that stands outside it, not a doctrine within the 
law. This outlook changed in the wake of World War II, where victors and 
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vanquished alike recoiled from the seemingly limitless violence the war inflicted. The 
post-War formula for military necessity appeared in the second round of Nuremberg 
trials, in the Hostages case:  
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply 
any amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of the 
enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money.
77
  
Call this the Hostages formulation. 
 As Dinstein notes, ‘The key words here are “subject to the laws of war” ’.
78
 
Now, instead of law being subordinated to military necessity, the law comes first.
79
 If 
a rule in the law of war provides an explicit exception for military necessity, well and 
good: the Kriegsraison principle applies. Thus, AP I allows states to restrict the 
movements of relief personnel ‘in case of imperative military necessity’.
80
 But most 
rules provide no such explicit exception, and they represent absolute limits on what 
war fighters may do regardless of military necessity. For example, AP I states that 
‘[t]he civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the 
object of attack’.
81
 This rule carves out no exception for military necessity. In theory, 
at any rate, the Hostages formulation rejects Hobbes’s view of war as a law-free zone; 
now, law governs war everywhere, by decreeing which rules will bend to military 
necessity and which will not. 
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 Momentous as this change is, the Hostages formulation remains 
overwhelmingly slanted in favor of militaries, and grants them enormous latitude. 
Read literally, military necessity includes any lawful act that saves a dollar or a day in 
the pursuit of military victory. These are claims of military convenience, not military 
necessity. Conceiving necessity in this remarkably broad fashion is a far cry from (for 
example) the Lieber Code’s definition of military necessity as ‘those measures which 
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to 
the modern law and usages of war’.
82
  
As Michael Walzer perceptively comments on the Hostages formulation, ‘In 
fact, this is not about necessity at all; it is a way of speaking in code, or a hyperbolical 
way of speaking, about probability and risk’.
83
 It is worthwhile spelling out why. One 
argument is that anything that reduces risk to soldiers’ lives in the slightest degree 
represents military necessity. Armies must place exceptional value on the life of each 
of their soldiers, and that is why steps taken to diminish risk to their soldiers’ lives, 
even very slightly, are militarily necessary.
84
 But time and money get equal billing 
with human life in the Hostages formulation, and it is impossible to justify cost-
cutting and quickness as transcendent values on a par with human life. Here, the 
argument would have to run differently: saving money and time might conceivably 
spell the difference between defeat and victory. For want of a nail, the shoe was lost, 
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so the horse was lost, so the rider was lost, so the battle was lost, so the kingdom was 
lost—‘and all for the want of a horseshoe nail’. You can’t know; therefore don’t take 
the risk. 
Calling this military necessity is, indeed, a hyperbolical way of speaking about 
remote risks. Under the Hostages formulation, an air force can use non-precision-
guided bombs rather than more discriminating precision-guided munitions merely 
because they are cheaper, or merely because commanders don’t want to wait for a 
shipment of PGMs to arrive, and describe the choice as military necessity; that is 
because there is always a remote probability that the extra money or time might spell 
the difference between victory and defeat. This way of thinking has devastating 
implications in interpreting treaty-based protections of civilians against ‘incidental’ 
damage of attacks. Those protections require militaries to take ‘feasible’ steps to 
protect civilians, and a plea of military necessity suggests that requiring the use of 
PGMs is infeasible. The Hostages formulation would allow states to declare 
precautions that impose even trivial added risk, expense, or delay ‘infeasible’ and 
therefore wholly optional. Hostages sells the brand-name ‘military necessity’ at the 
cheapest possible price. 
 It may be that the Hostages tribunal formulated its definition of necessity in 
such a permissive way because the judges understood that they were in no position to 
set standards about how much risk and expense militaries must assume, and therefore 
left it to the discretion of states and commanders. Understood this way, the Hostages 
formula is not so much a redefinition of military necessity to mean military 
convenience as it is a doctrine of deference to military judgment about what really is 
militarily necessary. If so, however, it is a doctrine of nearly absolute deference, and 
that too is hyperbolical.  
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 Essentially, the Hostages formula makes only a half-break from the doctrine 
of Kriegsraison. The distinctive feature in Kriegsraison is that it places the interests 
of the military beyond all regulation, in effect discounting the interests of civilians 
down to zero, the same as the suffering of enemy soldiers, which also counts for 
nothing or even less than nothing. The Hostages formula subordinates Kriegsraison to 
law, but simultaneously it inflates the concept of necessity to include anything the 
military finds helpful. Except to the extent built into explicit regulations, the interests 
of civilians and the suffering of the enemy are still discounted to zero. 
 Packaging anything the military finds helpful under the heading ‘necessity’ is 
not only dangerous but dishonest; but it flows naturally from an outlook in which 
interests other than military interests are simply invisible. 
6.3. The marginal view of necessity 
6.3.1. Necessity as proportionality: Beit Sourik 
 Once civilian interests enter our moral deliberations—as they must—the 
Hostages formula becomes unacceptable. Instead, what counts as military necessity 
must be determined by weighing military importance against civilian damage. We 
already find this way of thinking in Vitoria: 
[C]are must be taken to ensure that the evil effects of the war do not outweigh 
the possible benefits sought by waging it. If the storming of a fortress or town 
garrisoned by the enemy but full of innocent inhabitants is not of great 
importance for eventual victory in the war, it does not seem to me permissible 
to kill a large number of innocent people by indiscriminate bombardment in 
order to defeat a small number of enemy combatants.
85
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This would be true, presumably, even if bombarding the fortress or town would save 
time and money in pursuit of victory, or even if it slightly diminished risk to soldier 
lives. 
 Proportionality reasoning of this sort in fact follows the most recent law on 
military necessity, represented by the Israeli Supreme Court’s analysis of the 
separation barrier Israel constructed during the second intifada.
86
 Representatives of 
Palestinians harmed by the barrier brought lawsuits challenging the legality of land 
seizures for the barrier as well as specific routing decisions. The Supreme Court found 
that under IHL, civilian property could be seized (with compensation paid) ‘[t]o the 
extent that construction of the fence is a military necessity’.
87
 One disputed section of 
the fence was slated for a hill called Jebel Muktam. The Court deferred to the military 
commander’s judgment that alternative routes proposed by the plaintiffs offered less 
security than the Jebel Muktam route. On the Hostages formulation, that would have 
sufficed to demonstrate military necessity. Instead, the Court rejected Jebel Muktam 
because ‘the security advantage reaped from the route as determined by the military 
commander, in comparison to the … route [proposed by the plaintiffs], does not stand 
in any reasonable proportion to the injury to the local inhabitants caused by this 
route’.
88
 
Before examining the Israeli Supreme Court’s reasoning, it is worth noting the 
most important point: the form of analysis represents a step away from Kriegsraison 
just as momentous as the taming of military necessity by law in Hostages. Now, 
soldiers are no longer the only ones whose interests matter. A tactic that better meets 
the army’s security needs than any available alternatives is not militarily necessary if 
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one of the alternatives is much better for civilians and only slightly worse for the 
army. Civilians, including the enemy’s civilians, count. To see how they count, we 
must delve a bit deeper. 
 The Israeli Court analyzes necessity claims in three steps, which it labels 
proportionality tests.
89
 First, it asks whether the chosen military tactic bears a rational 
relationship to its goal, and second, whether that goal might be attained by an 
alternative that inflicts less damage on civilians. The first is uncontroversial, while the 
second seems like mere common sense. (Common sense or not, it is incompatible 
with the Hostages formula, which permits ‘any amount and kind of force’ to compel 
the enemy’s submission.) 
 Lastly, the Israeli Court weighs the gains to the military against the injury to 
civilians in marginal terms: 
the … act is tested vis-à-vis an alternate act, whose benefit will be somewhat 
smaller than that of the former one. The original … act is disproportionate … 
if a certain reduction in the advantage gained by the original act – by 
employing alternate means, for example – ensures a substantial reduction in 
the injury caused by the administrative act.
90
  
If so, the original act is not militarily necessary. 
The idea behind this ‘marginal’ view of necessity—analyzed and defended in 
recent work by Seth Lazar—is that the true military significance of an act is the gain it 
provides over the next-best alternative; it is ‘necessary’ only in the sense that it is 
necessary to achieve this marginal gain.
91
 Necessity judgments are inherently 
comparative. If the advantage over less harmful alternatives is too small, the claim of 
military necessity lacks normative force. 
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 Why should we accept the marginal view of military necessity? The reason 
follows from the normative point of appeals to military necessity: they are used to 
justify inflicting harms on others. To serve that purpose, they must answer the 
question, ‘Why won’t less damaging alternatives do?’ The answer must take the form 
‘The other alternatives don’t accomplish X’, pointing to some tangible advantage, 
‘and X is necessary’. That raises the obvious question ‘Necessary for what?’ The 
answer ‘Necessary to avert very small risks, delays, or expenses’ simply doesn’t do 
the job. Or rather, it doesn’t do the job unless the injuries inflicted are even slighter. 
That is why in the end, claims of military necessity are not only disguised 
comparative judgments (with other alternatives), but also disguised claims of 
proportionality.
92
  
 Although the Israeli court’s analysis is sophisticated, it is not idiosyncratic. In 
an important sense, denying the claim of necessity to small military advantages 
represents a return to the term’s traditional meaning: in Vitoria’s words, of ‘great 
importance for eventual victory in the war’, and in Lieber’s words, ‘indispensable for 
securing the ends of the war’. Necessary, one might say, means necessary. It is the 
Hostages formula that should be regarded as idiosyncratic. 
6.3.2. Koskenniemi’s objection 
 Some might object that proportionality judgments are no more determinate 
than the issues they are meant to resolve. Criticizing Beit Sourik, Martti Koskenniemi 
complains that ‘[i]f people were able to agree on what is reasonable or proportionate, 
no courts, or law would ever be needed’.
93
 In his view, talk about proportionality 
‘tests’ invokes pretensions of science that lawyers cannot possibly deliver on. 
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Proportionality begs the questions of whose interests count and how much weight to 
give them. Why balance only the military’s interest in ‘military security’ against the 
interests of Palestinian civilians? Why not include the interests of Jewish settlers, or 
for that matter the justice or injustice of the entire occupation?
94
 What makes the 
security of settlements a benefit rather than a cost?
95
 The Beit Sourik Court simply 
assumes there are answers to those questions – and so, in Koskenniemi’s eyes, the 
Court ‘pulls itself from the quicksand of ever receding argumentative chains onto firm 
ground like Munchhausen, by his own hair’.
96
  
 Koskenniemi’s imagery is striking, but matters are not as dire as he believes. I 
said above that claims of military necessity take on their sense as part of a practice of 
justifying acts of violence – to borrow Wittgenstein’s familiar phrase, a ‘language 
game’ of challenge and response. In response to the challenge ‘Why did you do this 
dreadful thing?’ the military answers ‘it was necessary to achieve our military goals’. 
The challenge-and-response language game presupposes an audience that does not 
reject the military’s goals in limine. Koskenniemi is right that that will not be every 
audience.
97
 Notably, ‘revisionist’ military ethicists who deny that morality permits 
acts of violence by the unjust side will not be a potential audience. For example, 
Thomas Hurka denies all claims of military necessity to the unjust side because ‘no 
act by soldiers on a side without just cause can satisfy proportionality’.
98
 Similarly, 
the audience for claims of military necessity may not include the enemy, for whom 
the only thing ‘necessary’ is that their adversary not achieve its goals – although even 
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the enemy might accept necessity claims out of reciprocity, because they too use 
violence and make necessity claims.  
 But threshold unwillingness to entertain military necessity claims does not 
make the meaning of military necessity indeterminate; it merely takes the concept off 
the table. If the concept of military necessity gets meaning from its use in a language 
game of normative challenge and response, the assumptions built into that language 
game may provide the determinacy we need. Here is how: 
The initial challenge ‘why did you do this dreadful thing?’ assumes damage to 
outsiders (typically civilians) that resulted from the military’s violence. That gives us 
one term of the balance: civilian damage. The necessity justification, linked to a 
military goal, gives us the second term: military advantage.  
Furthermore, in the same way that the practice of challenge and response 
presupposes an audience willing to entertain the response, it also presupposes an 
audience skeptical enough of the military to raise the challenge. It assumes, in other 
words, a more or less neutral audience. As such, the audience gives equal weight to 
the lives and other interests of all sides – another assumption that helps make 
proportionality judgments manageable.  
Bit by bit, as we flesh out the practice of normative challenge and response 
that gives military necessity claims their meaning, the interests to be compared 
become clearer. Of course Koskenniemi is right that nothing in principle limits us to 
just two terms – nothing except the fact that once the inquiry broadens to include 
indirect costs and benefits or larger issues of justice and injustice, the language game 
becomes unmanageably speculative. Thus another assumption built into the 
challenge-and-response practice is that it focuses on local and direct rather than global 
or indirect costs and benefits. In Beit Sourik, for example, the local and direct terms 
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are the marginal security advantage of Jebel Muktam over alternative routes versus 
marginal damage to civilians in these particular villages. Of course there is a far more 
important question about whether the separation barrier as a whole illegally impedes 
Palestinian self-determination as a whole; but that is simply a different question than 
the military necessity of a particular route. 
6.3.3 Necessity, law, and civilianization 
 Kriegsraison, the Hostages formulation, and proportionality represent three 
different views of military necessity. The first sees necessity as a pursuit of victory in 
which a commander is unbound by law and the interests of other people. The second 
subordinates necessity to law, but within the limits of law it permits the commander to 
discount civilian interests completely. The third requires the commander to take 
civilian interests into account—and, I have argued, this is the best view of military 
necessity. 
 Returning to the two cultures problem, this final step means that, like it or not, 
the LOAC view of the world must incorporate the interests that the IHL worldview 
emphasizes. The possibility of sealing itself off from the IHL version of the law of 
war no longer exists, for a concept of military necessity that considers only military 
advantage does no justificatory work. 
7. Conclusion 
 These arguments about military necessity are not meant as a ‘refutation’ of the 
LOAC version of the laws of war or anything resembling it. That would be silly. 
Military necessities are real, and law will not make them go away. The same is true of 
the other elements of the LOAC vision. States may no longer be the sole sources of 
international law, but we live in a world of states, which remain the preeminent 
international lawmakers. The laws of war must take the civilian point of view 
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seriously, but it is still a long step from there to human rights. On all these points, 
humanitarian lawyers who pretend otherwise are fooling themselves both legally and 
practically. Legally, because the sources of law will not bear so much humanitarian 
weight, and practically because the only hope for the humanitarian project lies in 
militaries and military lawyers who believe in it and want to make it happen. Like it 
or not, the two legal cultures must live with each other, and that requires 
reasonableness, in the sense defined by John Rawls: a reciprocal desire for principles 
that could be accepted even by adherents of the other comprehensive view. 
 To illustrate with an example: Article 57 of AP I requires militaries to take all 
‘feasible’ precautions to verify that their targets are legitimately military and to 
minimize civilian damage. Notoriously, there is no agreement on what ‘feasible’ 
means. Does it include anything technologically possible, regardless of cost or risk to 
the attacker? Alternatively, does it exclude anything that might increase military risk, 
no matter how slightly? Clearly, militaries could not reasonably accept the former, 
and humanitarians could not reasonably accept the latter – so, on my proposal, neither 
of these interpretations can be right, and lawyers should not advance them. 
 This conciliatory approach is not self-evident. In purely scientific pursuits, 
epistemologists offer powerful arguments that it is more rational both for individual 
researchers and the scientific community at large if competing research programs 
forcefully press their own agendas, even in cases when one program is less likely than 
its rivals to be fruitful.
99
 Lawyers are, for obvious reasons, instinctively drawn to a 
similarly adversarial, competitive model of truth seeking. Why not let the LOAC and 
IHL versions of the law of war continue to compete for supremacy? Is that not the 
most likely way in which truth will out? 
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 The obvious difference is that lawyers arguing about the interpretation of law 
are not pursuing hidden truths. They are not physicists hunting the Higgs boson or 
mathematicians vying for the honor of being first to solve a famous problem.
100
 They 
are trying to give concrete meaning to past lawmakers’ constructions, in order to 
impose discipline on violence when collectivities go to war. The obvious danger in an 
adversarial competition over who owns the law of war is one David Kennedy 
highlights: when legal interpretation turns into a political game, the players’ trust in 
each other’s candor inevitably erodes, so that ‘as we use the discourse more, we 
believe it less – at least when spoken by others’.
101
 The result (Kennedy adds) is a law 
of armed combat that undermines itself and casts its own legitimacy into disrepute, 
even in the eyes of its practitioners.  
 I wholeheartedly agree with this diagnosis, but not with Kennedy’s cure, 
which is to downplay legality in favor of pure choice – to ‘be wary of treating the 
legal issues as the focal points for our ethics and politics’.
102
 In place of legalism, 
Kennedy calls for ‘recapturing the human experience of responsibility for the violence 
of war’ – accepting that ‘those who kill do “decide in the exception”, … [and] as men 
and women, our military, political, and legal experts are, in fact, free – free from the 
comfortable ethical and political analytics of expertise, but not from responsibility for 
the havoc they unleash’.
103
 His argument appears to be that debates over the laws of 
war are irredeemably strategic. Officers and political leaders – and, for that matter, 
humanitarians – find it all too convenient to fob responsibility onto lawyers and the 
law when in fact the law is ‘an elaborate discourse of evasion’.
104
  
                                                
100
 For further discussion of this point, see Luban, supra note 13, at 194-96. 
101
 Kennedy, supra note 2, at 135. 
102
 Ibid., at 167. 
103
 Ibid., at171. 
104
 Ibid., at 169. 
 55 
But suppose there were no LOAC or ICL. Do we really believe that more 
responsible decisions would result, that fewer lives would be lost, or that an 
alternative and better vocabulary than ‘the analytics of expertise’ would arise for 
deliberation? I see no reason to think so. Without some vocabulary for deliberation, 
the pure experience of responsibility floats in a vacuum and goes nowhere. Like it or 
not, and no matter where we end up, we must start with the vocabulary we have. That 
is the legal vocabulary of the law of war, heavily inflected with the just war theory of 
past centuries. Where else could we start? In Quine’s words, ‘We are like sailors who 
on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never able to start afresh from the 
bottom’.
105
 
 The two cultures are stuck with each other aboard the same wounded ship. The 
argument of this article has been that their differing comprehensive views arise from 
competing premises about the primacy of military necessity and human dignity. Both 
are reasonable premises, and mutual recognition that they are reasonable – more 
precisely, willingness to discard one’s own interpretations if a similarly willing 
adherent to the alternative view could not possibly accept them – seems like a 
plausible canon of interpretation. It is also most plausible strategy for achieving 
whatever convergence is humanly possible. 
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